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Abstract
Regret minimizing strategies for repeated games have been receiving increasing
attention in the literature. These are simple adaptive behavior rules that exhibit
nice convergence properties. If all players follow regret minimizing strategies, their
average joint play converges to the set of correlated equilibria or to the Hannan
set (depending on the notion of regret in use), or even to Nash equilibrium on
certain classes of games. In this note we raise the question of validity of the regret
minimization objective. By example we show that regret minimization can lead to
unrealistic behavior, since it fails to take into account the eect of one's actions on
subsequent behavior of the opponents. An amended notion of regret that corrects
this defect is not very useful either, since achieving a no-regret objective is not
guaranteed in that case.
Keywords: Repeated games, regret minimization, no-regret strategy
JEL classication numbers: C73, D81
1. Introduction. In a repeated interaction, an individual follows a regret-minimizing
strategy if, loosely speaking, she reinforces those actions that she regrets not having played
enough in the past. A particularly simple strategy is regret matching, which is dened by
the following rule:
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1Switch next period to a dierent action with a probability that is propor-
tional to the regret for that action, where regret is dened as the increase in
payo had such a change always been made in the past (Hart and Mas-Colell,
2000; Hart, 2005).
This strategy, in particular, includes rules of thumb which act according to \Never change
a winning team," in other words, do not switch to a dierent action, as long as the current
action keeps being a best reply to the observed (average) actions of the opponents.
Regret-minimizing strategies received a lot of attention in the recent literature.1 The
main value of these strategies is that they are simple adaptive behavior rules that are nei-
ther computationally demanding nor relying on common knowledge assumptions and yet
exhibiting nice convergence properties. If all players follow regret-minimizing strategies,
their average joint play converges to the set of correlated equilibria or to the Hannan set2,
depending on the notion of regret in use (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000; see also Lehrer 2003,
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi 2006); or even to Nash equilibria on certain classes of games
(Hart and Mas-Colell 2003; Marden, Arslan, and Shamma 2007).
In this note we raise the question of validity of the regret minimization objective
in the context of games. On the one hand, according to the notions of regret used in
the literature, an individual who contemplates whether she could have done better by
having played a particular action more often in the past does not take into account the
eect of her actions on the subsequent behavior of her opponent. This is perfectly ne
in a decision making environment, but not in a game, where, by denition, players are
responsive to the opponents' behavior. We show by example that failure to take the
opponent's responsiveness into account may lead to unrealistic behavior.3
On the other hand, if we extend the notion of regret to take into account the above
mentioned eect, then it becomes impossible to guarantee no regrets, even against a
severely restricted set of the opponent's strategies. We show that if opponent is even
1A non-exhaustive list includes Littlestone and Warmuth (1994), Fudenberg and Levine (1995), Foster
and Vohra (1998), Foster and Vohra (1999), Freund and Schapire (1999), Hart and Mas-Colell (2000),
Hart and Mas-Colell (2001), Hart and Mas-Colell (2003), Lehrer (2003), Young (2004), Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi (2003), Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), Lehrer and Solan (2009).
2The Hannan set of a game is the set of all mixed action proles that satisfy Hannan's (1957) no-regret
condition. It is also known as the set of coarse correlated equilibria rst appeared in Moulin and Vial
(1978), but explicitly dened as a solution concept by Young (2004, Ch.3).
3This problem is recognized in the computer science literature, e.g., Farias and Megiddo (2004) and
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006, Ch.7.11). These works show that regret minimizing strategies fail to
lead to the cooperative outcome in a repeated prisoner's dilemma. Our example is dierent and, as we
believe, has a value on its own, as it illuminates failure to learn the Pareto dominant equilibrium of a
one-shot game, whereas the above literature shows failure to learn playing strictly dominated actions.
2\slightly" adaptive to the player's past behavior, the \no-regrets" objective cannot be
achieved.
We conclude that regret-minimizing behavior rules, either with the original notion
of regret or with the one that takes into account the opponent's reaction, are not very
appealing when describing behavior of real subjects in repeated interactions where one's
past actions may aect the other's reaction, in particular, in repeated games.
2. Regrets. Consider a nite two-player game, with players named Alice and Bob.4
Let A and B be sets of actions of Alice and Bob, respectively, and let u : A  B ! R
be Alice's payo function. The game is played repeatedly in time periods t = 1;2;:::, in
which players choose actions (at;bt). The history of realized actions is observable for both
players.
Consider Alice before period T +1 and let a = aT be her most recent action. Denote







and denote by UT(a0) the average payo that Alice would have obtained had she played















u(a0;bt); if at = a;
u(at;bt); if at 6= a:




0)    UT:
According to the above denition, Alice evaluates her regret for some action a0 relative
to the reference action a (the most recently played one) by contemplating how much
higher payo, on average, she could have received had she played a0 in every past period
when she actually played a, assuming that the play of the opponents would have remained
4Bob can be considered as a set of players, so the arguments presented below trivially extend to
n-player games.
3unchanged. This denition is plausible in the context of decision making, when an in-
dividual's actions have no eect on the opponent, who can be perceived as an abstract
environment. It is much less appealing if the individual is engaged in a game, where the






3. An example. For illustration, consider the following coordination game (Fig.
1). Suppose that the observed play up to period T is ((a1;b1);(a2;b2);:::;(aT;bT)) =
((L;L);(L;L);:::;(L;L)). Given this history, from the perspective of Alice, playing L is
a best reply to the average realized play of Bob.
Does Alice have regret for action R? Not according to the above denition, since in
every period she would have miscoordinated with Bob, so rT(R) =  1.
Could Alice have done better by having switched to R?
(I) No, if Bob's strategy is independent of Alice's actions.
(II) Possibly, if Bob's strategy is adaptive, so that Bob could have followed Alice after
observing her trying to coordinate on a Pareto superior outcome.
Since Alice and Bob are engaged in a game, it would be unrealistic to assume that Bob
ignores all information obtained during past play. In games, scenario (II) is much more
plausible. Thus, the described notion of regret is not very appealing, and behavior rules
based on this notion could lead to outcomes that are unlikely to occur in interactions of
real subjects.
4. Regrets against history dependent behavior. Let us now introduce a dif-
ferent notion of regret that accounts for the opponent's reaction. Denote by hT =
((a1;b1);:::;(aT;bT)) the history of play up to T, and let H be the set of all nite histo-
ries. Let  : H ! (A) and  : H ! (B) be strategies of Alice and Bob, respectively,
that prescribe mixed actions for every history ht 2 H. Denote by UT(;) the expected










where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure over H induced
by (;).
Fix Alice's strategy . Denote by (aja0) the strategy obtained from  by replacement
of a by a0 in all periods where the realized action of  is a. Formally, for every history
h 2 H let
(aja0)(h)[a





where (h)[k] denotes the probability that (h) assigns to action k 2 A.
Consider Alice before period T + 1 and let a = aT be her most recent action. For
a given strategy  of Bob, UT((aja0);) is the expected average payo that Alice would
have obtained had she played a0 every time in the past when her strategy  stipulated to
play a, and when at every stage t  T Bob would have responded according to  to the
new history.




UT((aja0);)    UT:
Thus, if T(a0)  0, then Alice can conclude that she could not have done better by
switching a to a0 in the past, no matter what is the actual strategy of Bob.
A strategy of Alice is called a no-regret strategy against B if it guarantees that Alice's









 0 with probability one:
It is known that there exist no-regret strategies against an irresponsive opponent,
i.e., when B contains only deterministic sequences (e.g., Hannan, 1957; Hart and Mas-
Colell, 2000, 2001; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2003). Yet, as we show below, a minimum
of adaptiveness of Bob's strategies to Alice's past actions leads to an impossibility result.
Bob's strategy is called q-ctitious play if in every period t = 2;3;:::, with probability
51   q Bob repeats his last-period action, and with probability q he best-replies to Alice's
average past play. The initial play of Bob is arbitrary.
For some " > 0 denote by B" the set of q-ctitious play strategies with q 2 [0;"].
In particular, B" contains non-adaptive strategies where Bob plays a constant action (0-
ctitious play).
Proposition. For every " > 0, there does not exist a no-regret strategy against B".
Proof. The proof is by example. Consider the coordination game described earlier (Fig.
1). Fix " > 0 and suppose that Bob plays q-ctitious play, q 2 B", q 2 [0;"], and let his
initial action be L.
Observe that the only possible source of regret for Alice is her inability to distinguish
the case of q = 0 from q > 0. Indeed, if Alice knew that q = 0, then her best reply would
be to always play L, since Bob is non-adaptive and repeats L forever, so  UT = UT(L) ! 1.
On the other hand, if she knew that q > 0, then her best reply would be to always play
R, since eventually, with probability 1, Bob would switch to R after observing Alice's
past average play being R, and the further play would be locked in (R;R) forever, so
 UT = UT(R) ! 100.
Denote by zt the frequency of R in Alice's past actions, zt = 1
tjfk  t : ak = Rgj. Then
in every period t  2, with probability q Bob plays R if zt > 1=100 and plays L otherwise
(the tie can be resolved arbitrarily); with probability 1   q Bob repeats his last-period
action. Consider the subsequence of periods, ftsgS
s=1, where the event fzts > 1=100g
occurs. For every s, the probability that Bob has never played R up to ts is equal to




UT(R)    UT  100   [(1   (1   q)
S)  100 + (1   q)
S  1] = 99(1   q)
S;
which, for any given S, is bounded away from zero for every small enough q.
Next, let S = 1. Then lims!1(1   q)s ! 0 if and only if q > 0. So, for every q > 0,
limT!1 UT(R)    UT ! 0, and Alice has no regrets. However, for q = 0, this strategy of
Alice requires zts > 1=100 for every s = 1;2;:::, and hence
 Uts = zts  0 + (1   zts)  1 < 99=100;
while Uts(L) = 1. Thus, on the subsequence ftsg of periods, the regret for L is at least
1=100.
6It follows that no matter what Alice plays, there exists a strategy in B of Bob such
that limsup of Alice's regret for one of the actions is bounded away from zero.
The reason for this negative result is that the probability that Bob's type (q = 0 or
q > 0) is revealed does not converge to one uniformly across B", as T ! 1. That is, after
every T, if Bob has never played R so far, there is no upper bound on Alice's posterior
belief that q = 0. In other words, Alice cannot distinguish the cases q = 0 and q > 0, no
matter how long she observes Bob's behavior.
Bob
Alice L M R
L 2;2 1;1 0;0
R 0;0 1;1 2;2
Figure 2
Another example is less subtle and shows that no regret cannot be achieved if an
opponent uses trigger strategies. Consider the game on Fig. 2 and suppose that the set
of strategies of Bob includes the following:
(non-adaptive) Bob constantly plays M.
(adaptive-L) Bob starts with M. Then, if Alice played L in the initial period, then Bob
will play L from period 2 forever, otherwise he will play M forever.
(adaptive-R) the same as adaptive-L except L is replaced by R.
In this game, Alice's long-run average payo is determined entirely by Bob's type and
Alice's initial action, since Bob's actions are constant from period 2 on. Now observe
that no matter what Alice plays in period 1, there is a type of Bob, either adaptive-L or
adaptive-R, that would make her regret for action L or R, respectively, in all subsequent
periods. Indeed, if Alice chooses, for instance, L in the rst period and Bob's type is
adaptive-R, then the following play of Bob will be constantly M, and Alice's average
payo will be 1. However, Alice could have obtained the average payo of 2, had she
started her play with R.
5. Conclusion. To sum up, the notion of regret used in the literature is not satisfactory
in the context of repeated games as it fails to take into account possible reaction of
opponents to changes in one's actions. We dene an extended notion of regret, with
7respect to opponents' strategies (rather than realized actions) and show that in this case
no-regret strategies need not exist when the opponents are adaptive. Two examples
provide the intuition for this result: the regrets persist because the opponent's strategy
cannot be statistically identied (as in the former example) or because the opponent uses
trigger strategies, where an early decision of the player (which is payo-relevant for the
the entire innitely repeated interaction) has to be made when the player has not been
yet informed about the opponent's strategy.
We conclude that the notion of regret, whether the original or the extended one, should
be used with caution in the context of repeated games where players may respond to one
another's behavior.
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